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A B S T R A C T
Intentionally inducing worst-case thermal runaway scenarios in Li-ion cells on-demand is a deﬁnitive way to test
the eﬃcacy of battery systems in safely mitigating the consequences of catastrophic failure. An internal short-
circuiting (ISC) device is implanted into three 18650 cell designs: one standard, one with a bottom vent, and one
with a thicker casing. Through an extensive study of 228 cells, the position at which thermal runaway initiates is
shown to greatly aﬀect the tendency of cells to rupture and incur side-wall breaches at speciﬁc locations. The
risks associated with each failure mechanism and position of the ISC device are quantiﬁed using a custom
calorimeter that can decouple the heat from ejected and non-ejected contents. Causes of high-risk failure me-
chanisms, such as bursting and side-wall breaches, are elucidated using high-speed synchrotron X-ray imaging at
2000 frames per second and image-based 3D thermal runaway computational models, which together are used to
construct a comprehensive description of external risks based on internal structural and thermal phenomena.
1. Introduction
The continued widespread adoption of lithium-ion (Li-ion) batteries
for a plethora of applications, from e-cigarettes to manned-spacecraft, is
accompanied by an urgent need for eﬀective safety testing strategies.
One sure way of knowing that a battery system is ‘safe’ is by testing its
response to the ‘worst-case’ failure scenarios. A Li-ion battery can fail
catastrophically when a process known as ‘thermal runaway’ occurs.
That is, at a critical temperature and in the presence of non-aqueous
liquid electrolytes and oxygen [1], the active materials within a Li-ion
battery can exothermically react [1–4]. Exothermic reactions can be-
come self-sustaining when local heat generation is greater than heat
dissipation, resulting in violent combustion and total cell failure.
During thermal runaway, it has been estimated that about 2 L of gas is
generated per amp hour (Ah) of commercial LiFePO4 and LiNixCoyAlzO2
18650 cells [5]. Modern 18650 cells have capacities greater than 3 Ah,
and can generate more than 6 L of gas within ca. 2 s during thermal
runaway, which is mostly ﬂammable [1]. In this short time (< 2 s),
more than 70 kJ of heat can also be generated [6] and surface
temperatures greater than 600 °C can be reached [7,8]. Avoiding a
hazardous pressure build-up and violent ruptures [9], as well as safely
dissipating the heat during this period, poses considerable challenges,
both in the design of single cells and complete battery systems. If heat
and pressure are not safely managed during thermal runaway, side-wall
breaches can occur, where the casing of a cell is breached either by
thermally-induced melting or by pressure-induced splits. Side-wall
breaches are most catastrophic for cells encased in a rigid material such
as the steel container used in 18650 cells. Such side-wall breaches
present an alternate path for pressure relief in the form of an ignited
ﬂare of ﬂammable product gases and electrolyte. When side-wall
breaches and ﬂares occur, they can often defeat interstitial heat-sink
materials and impinge neighboring cells directly, leading to propaga-
tion of thermal runaway from cell to cell [6,10], and hence present the
greatest challenge in preventing propagation.
The occurrence of a side-wall breach is widely considered to be
among the ‘worst-case’ failure scenarios. For mission critical applica-
tions (e.g. the battery pack of the NASA spacesuit life-support system),
all practical measures must be taken to minimize/eliminate the risk of
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catastrophic failure. Rigorous abuse testing is carried out to identify
vulnerabilities of the battery system. Where possible, it is prudent to
reproduce failure scenarios that will most challenge conceivable vul-
nerabilities within the battery system. This might require, for example,
the ability to reliably control when and where (for orienting towards
adjacent cells) side-wall breaches occur in high energy density cells.
Currently, when the eﬃcacy of a module in preventing propagation of
thermal runaway is tested, an individual cell is most often failed by
either applying a patch heater [11] or by nail penetration [12–14]. Both
methods have limitations. Surface heating and nail penetration can only
be applied to relatively simple pack conﬁgurations [11,14] and neither
method can reliably induce worst-case failure scenarios. For example,
nail penetration has previously been shown to lead to less violent
thermal runaway events due to the nail pinning the electrode assembly
inside the casing, the nail acting as a heat sink, spreading the short-
circuit across a large area, and creating an additional path for pressure
relief [12]. Surface heating via patch heaters, or otherwise, lacks con-
trol of the location where thermal runaway will initiate [8], requires
additional space and wiring, aﬀects the structural integrity of the
casing, and takes minutes of heating to reach the critical temperature of
Fig. 1. (a) Illustrations showing the various positions of the ISC device in the test-cells. (b) Plot showing the pressure at which the bottom and top (CID) vents activate
and the cell bursts, for cells with a bottom vent feature. The bottom vent is shown in the inset photograph. (c) Plot showing the pressure at which the top vent (CID)
activates and the cell bursts for cells without a bottom vent. The inset photograph shows the base of the cell without a bottom vent. (d) Illustration showing an
external view of the assembled fractional thermal runaway calorimeter (FTRC) and (e) illustration showing a view of the internal components of the FTRC, high-
lighting the insulating ceramic bushings (blue) between the cell and ejecta chambers, as well as the components inside the bore chamber that capture the heat from
escaping gases and debris. (For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the Web version of this article.)
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thermal runaway providing more time for the electrode assembly to dry
following initial venting. Drying of the electrode assembly also occurs
for other testing methods such as oven tests [15] or accelerating rate
calorimetry [7,16,17]. For complex battery systems, where accessibility
for abuse testing is challenging, safety-focused computational models
are crucial for predicting outcomes of a single cell undergoing thermal
runaway inside a system [18,19]. However, the predictive capability of
a model is dependent upon the accuracy of the experimental mea-
surements used to inform the model parameters [20,21], adding further
incentive to facilitate a method of inducing ‘worst-case’ thermal run-
away scenarios in complex systems, and subsequently recording the
data for further modelling analyses.
The ideal scenario for maximizing the heat output from a cell is for
it to undergo a hard internal-short circuit, such that thermal runaway
initiates and begins to propagate instantaneously without allowing time
for the electrolyte to vent and escape the system. There have been
numerous approaches used to trigger internal short circuits inside cells
on demand [10,22,23]. In this work, we use an internal short circuiting
(ISC) device that utilizes a low melting point wax to create, on-demand,
an internal short circuit between the Al positive current collector and
the surface of the graphite negative electrode [10]. This type of short
circuit is considered to be the most likely to induce thermal runaway as
it connects two highly electrically conducting materials where the heat
dissipation for the graphite material is relatively low due to its porous
architecture [10,24]. This ISC device is selectively positioned within
18650 test-cells to determine the inﬂuence of the location of failure
initiation on the risk of certain unfavorable failure mechanisms, such as
bursting and local side-wall breaches. In an extensive study of 228 cells,
the risks associated with each location of the ISC device are compared
by assessing the probability that the cell undergoes bursting or
breaching at a particular location. Three test-cell designs are compared:
a standard 18650 cell, an 18650 cell with a bottom vent, and an
18650 cell with a thicker casing. In addition to considering the prob-
ability of a cell to burst or breach, risks are assessed based on their
surface temperature proﬁles and the total quantity as well as fractions
of heat generated from ejected and non-ejected materials. High-speed
synchrotron X-ray imaging is used to capture the internal structural
dynamics, allowing, for the ﬁrst time, internal events to be linked to
external risks. The thermal and radiography data are used to inform a
computational thermal runaway model for an 18650 cell elucidating
both dynamic internal and surface temperatures, yielding a quantitative
description of regions that are most susceptible to breaching. This work
also marks the ﬁrst time that real-time internal dynamics of a cell un-
dergoing thermal runaway are used to inform a computational model.
2. Experiment
2.1. Preparation of cells
To determine the location where the initiation of thermal runaway
poses the greatest external risk, an internal short-circuiting (ISC) de-
vice, developed between NASA and NREL [10,25], was integrated into
18650 test-cells at 6 diﬀerent locations within the cells: 6 or 3 layers
deep, and at the top, middle or bottom of the electrode assembly
(Fig. 1). All cells passed a<5% self-discharge from 100% SOC over 3
months. The ISC device is designed to mimic the eﬀect of a defect inside
the electrode assembly causing a short, and herein creates a short cir-
cuit between the positive current collector and the graphite active
material on the negative electrode, which is deemed the most likely
type of short for the initiation of thermal runaway [24]. Dimensions
and details surrounding the construction of the ISC device are provided
in a previous study [10]. The internal short occurs when the ISC device
reaches 57 °C, the wax interface between the positive and negative sides
melts, and the winding tension of the electrode assembly compresses
the layers resulting in a conducting path.
The 18650 test-cells utilized herein had capacities of 3.35 Ah, an
NMC positive electrode, graphite negative electrode, and were each
charged to 100% SOC (4.2 V) before testing. All cell designs had a mass
between 47.0 g and 47.8 g, and had a diameters< 18.15mm. Test-cells
with and without an implanted ISC device were tested and compared.
Three casing designs were also tested; one with a bottom vent (BV)
feature (inset in Fig. 1b) and one without (inset of Fig. 1c) where both
cells had a 220 μm thick casing. The third design was a non-bottom vent
(NBV) cell with 250 μm thick casing. All other features of the cells
(chemistry, electrode assembly, header design, etc.) were identical. The
bottom vent consists of weakened annulus on the base plate that acts as
a bursting disk, and is designed to rupture at a pressure between the
bursting pressure of the current interrupt device (CID) and the pressure
required to extend the spin-groove and lead to ejection of contents [9].
The pressures required to activate the CID, bottom vent, and to extend
the spin groove were tested by cutting the 18650 cells mid-way along
the cell longitudinally, sealing the remaining half (top or bottom) into a
mechanical ﬁtting with epoxy, and slowly increasing the pressure until
the device activated. To test the pressure at which the spin-groove ex-
tends and the cell bursts, an additional step of blocking the CID with
epoxy was required. The activation pressures of each pressure relief
mechanism for the test-cells are shown in Fig. 1b–c where all tests were
carried out at room temperature.
2.2. Calorimetry
To determine the risks associated with overall heat generation and
the distribution of heat generated from ejected and non-ejected mate-
rials, calorimetry was carried out in a custom-designed fractional
thermal runaway calorimeter (FTRC) that can decouple the heat output
from the casing of cells and ejected contents (Fig. 1d and e). The FTRC
was designed to capture and isolate the heat from contents ejected from
the top and bottom of 18650 cells and was described in detail in a
previous study by the authors [6]. The 18650 cells were placed inside
an aluminum cell chamber assembly that was thermally isolated from
the ejecta mating and ejecta bore assemblies in which a system of Al
baﬄes and Cu mesh capture the heat from ejecting gas and solids,
thereby enabling the decoupling of heat from the cell casing conduction
and ejecta. The cell chamber was heated using four heating cartridges
supplied with 1 kW of continuous power (at 250 V and 4 A) until the
cell underwent thermal runaway. For cells containing an ISC device,
thermal runaway typically occurred within ca. 40 s of heating, whereas
cells without an ISC device typically took ca. 90 s. Upon thermal run-
away, the power supply was immediately switched oﬀ and the sub-
sequent heat stemming from the cell and its ejected content continued
to heat the system. The heat from each component of the calorimeter
was calculated based on the temperature response of each component,
allowing quantiﬁcation of the total heat output, as well as the fractions
of heat that arose from the cell, contents ejected from the top of the cell,
and contents ejected from the bottom of the cell. As the calorimeter is
composed of aluminum, which only weakly attenuates high energy X-
rays, simultaneous high-speed X-ray imaging was carried out, allowing
heat generation and temperatures to be characterized with respect to
internal phenomena.
2.3. Stand-alone tests and thermal imaging
To identify the risks associated with hot-spots and ﬂares, tests were
carried out in an open environment inside a containment system (de-
scribed in previous work [9,10]) with infra-red-transparent sapphire
windows for simultaneous high-speed thermal imaging during X-ray
imaging experiments. The cells were heated using a NiCr heating wire
wrapped circumferentially near their base. A thin coat of thermally
conductive ceramic putty (Cotronics 950) was applied to the cell base to
adhere a layer of ﬁreproof mica tape, which was placed between the
high-resistance wire and the surface of the 18650 cells, the wire was
then coated in electrically isolating ceramic putty (Cotronics 907 GF)
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and allowed to set. Finally, an additional wrap of Mika tape was ap-
plied. A gap of ca. 2mm between the bottom of the heating ﬁxture and
the base of the cell was left for the cell to be secured in place by a shaft
collar (photograph included in Supplementary Information). The two-
piece shaft collar applied equal and constant pressure circumferentially.
Inside the containment system the shaft collar was held in place by
hydraulic clamps that kept the cell inside the ﬁeld of view for thermal
and X-ray imaging. The cells were held mid-air at ca. 15mm above the
surface of the containment to allow successful activation of the BV and
subsequent ejection. Most cells described herein were tested at a syn-
chrotron facility using this setup, but, due to time being limited at the
synchrotron facilities, further tests were carried out at the NASA
Johnson Space Center to improve statistical signiﬁcance of observa-
tions. These tests involved non-ISC cells only (with and without BVs),
and were conducted in an oven set at 250 °C.
The surface temperature of the cells was measured using a thermal
camera (FLIR SC5000MB, FLIR Systems France, Croissy-Beaubourg,
France) which had an InSb detector that was sensitive to wavelengths
between 2.5 μm and 5.1 μm. The thermal camera was operated in its
high temperature range, covering from 200 °C to 1500 °C, for which the
noise equivalent temperature diﬀerence was<20mK and the mea-
surement accuracy was± 1% of the measured temperature in degrees
Celsius. The thermal camera was situated ca. 30 cm from the cell behind
a 2mm thick infra-red transparent sapphire window. Images were re-
corded at 50 Hz, which allowed a high temporal resolution of the spa-
tial surface temperature proﬁles. The 18650 cells were painted in a
heat-resistant black paint which had a calibrated emissivity [26] of 0.96
over the range of 50–200 °C.
2.4. X-ray imaging
High-speed X-ray imaging was carried out at beamline ID19 at The
European Synchrotron (ESRF). The cells were imaged under a poly-
chromatic beam with a pixel size of 11.35 μm and varying ﬁelds-of-view
(FOV) and frame rates, from 2000 fps with a FOV of 1822×1140
pixels (horizontal × vertical), to 9141 fps with a FOV of 1616×316
pixels (horizontal × vertical). A PCO.Dimax (PCO AG, Germany) de-
tector and LuAG(Ce) (Lu3Al5O12:Ce) scintillator were used for all high-
speed imaging experiments. The radiographs were ﬂat-ﬁeld corrected
and enhanced using MATLAB's adaptive histogram equalization
(adapthisteq) function. Imaging properties and post-processing were
similar to previous studies [9,10,12].
2.5. Modelling
Thermal runaway involves multi-physics behavior. An integrated
model is used to explore interplays between chemical, thermal, elec-
trical characteristics, environmental conditions, and types of faults. A
multi-scale multi-physics Li-ion cell model is employed to address the
three-dimensional spatial impact of an internal short circuit. The
modelling tool, based on the multi-scale multi-domain (MSMD) mod-
elling framework [27], has a modularized hierarchical architecture,
allowing independent choice of sub-models. To address the response of
a Li-ion cell to an internal short circuit, three component models are
integrated into the MSMD tool to compute instant heat generation:
localized short-circuit current and accompanying joule heat at shorted
cell volume, cell-wide current ﬂow and corresponding electrochemical
heat, and exothermic decomposition reactions at elevated temperature
[28]. Therefore, the local heat generation rate, ′′q¯x , is a sum of heat
ﬂuxes from each of the component models (Eq. (1)).
′ = ′ + ′ + ′
′ ′ ′ ′q q q q¯ ¯ ¯ ¯x x ech x ark x srt, , , (1)
Where, ′′q¯x ech, includes ohmic heat and electrochemical heat, ′
′q¯x ark, is the
heat from high temperature decomposition reactions, and ′′q¯x srt, re-
presents the heat generated from ohmic loss through the short circuit. A
plot of the time-dependent individual contributions of each heat source
is provided in Supplementary Material. A 3D model was constructed
using parameters drawn from the actual 3.35 Ah 18650 cells utilized
herein and are summarized in Supplementary Information. The reaction
rate equations and modelling parameters used herein are provided in
Supplementary Information. Three simulations were carried out cor-
responding to the three positions of the ISC device shown in Fig. S2 of
Supplementary Material. The current model does not account for mass
loss during the process of thermal runaway.
When the temporal surface temperatures were generated for the
three simulations, an additional step of applying temperature-depen-
dent tensile strength properties of the casing was applied to estimate
the bursting pressure of the casing. The tensile strength as a function of
temperature of a common structural steel (S350GD) [29] was used, the
data and functions for which are provided in Supplementary Informa-
tion. The burst pressures were estimated using Barlow's formula (Eq.
(2)), which calculates the bursting pressure (P) from the ultimate tensile
strength of the casing material (S), the thickness of the casing (t), and




3. Results and discussion
3.1. Overview of testing results
The ‘worst-case’ failure mechanism is broadly considered to be the
type of failure that leads to the most hazardous, costly, and catastrophic
outcome. This can be classiﬁed as a function of safety and economics,
where the speciﬁc application determines how each factor is weighed.
Here, we consider phenomena at the cell level that occur during
thermal runaway and may lead to the most unfavorable or ‘worst-case’
outcome. The primary factors of concern during failure are the thermal
behavior of the cell and its propensity to undergo an uncontrolled
ejection of hot, electrically conducting material. Both the thermal be-
havior and the propensity of 18650 cells to undergo uncontrolled
ejection are considered here. The location and vector of the ejection
determines the associated risks. For example, a side-wall breach might
lead to the most hazardous and costly failure by incurring the highest
risk of causing cell-to-cell propagation inside a module. Here, we use
the term ‘bursting’ to describe when an ejection is ‘uncontrolled’ and
involves the header components of the cell being released from the
main casing, which is often accompanied by the internal electrode as-
sembly escaping as a single projectile. Whereas during ‘controlled’
ejection, the header components remain in place and the ﬂuidized in-
ternal materials escape through the vent ports avoiding the formation of
projectiles. Hence, similar amounts of mass may be released during
controlled and uncontrolled ejections, but the mechanisms, rate, and
consequences of the mass release diﬀer. Uncontrolled ejection is thus
further classiﬁed into ﬁve diﬀerent types, examples of which are shown
in Fig. 2a:
1. Bursting through the top
2. Bursting through the bottom (mostly applicable to BV cells)
3. Casing breach near the top
4. Casing breach on the side
5. Casing breach near the bottom
Oxidation-induced discoloration on the surface of casings was also
treated as an indicator that the discolored region incurred signiﬁcant
thermal stress and may have an increased susceptibility to thermal-in-
duced breaches (e.g. see Fig. 2b). The likelihood of a single cell design
to undergo one of the ﬁve failure types is expected to be strongly de-
pendent on the internal phenomena during thermal runaway, such as
the location of thermal runaway initiation. To test this, an experimental
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Fig. 2. (a) Photographs showing examples of speciﬁed failure mechanisms. (b) Discoloring that can occur at high-risk regions when a breach does not form. (c) Table
showing the fraction of non-ISC BV and NBV cells with 220 μm and 250 μm casing thicknesses that underwent bursting and breaches. The number in the colored
boxes is the fraction of the total cells tested that underwent the speciﬁed failure mechanisms. The fraction of cells that contained the entire process of thermal
runaway without bursting is also shown. (d) Table showing the behavior of cells that had an ISC device integrated 6 layers deep at three diﬀerent longitudinal
locations for BV cells with a 220 μm casing and (e) for NBV cells with a 250 μm casing. (f) Equivalent table for cells with an ISC device integrated 3 layers deep. (g–h)
Time stamped sequence of thermal images taken during thermal runaway, and photographs showing the top and bottom vents of the cell for (g) a cell where the top
vent is facing up, that incurred a top breach where the ISC device was located near the top and (h) a cell where the bottom vent is facing up, that incurred a bottom
breach where the ISC device was located near the bottom. The yellow and red arrows in the thermal images indicate the orientation of the cell and the direction of the
venting ﬂare, respectively. Thermal imaging movies for (g) and (h) are provided as Supplementary Movies 1 and 2. (For interpretation of the references to color in
this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the Web version of this article.)
D.P. Finegan et al. Journal of Power Sources 417 (2019) 29–41
33
matrix where several cells are tested for a range of diﬀerent locations of
initiation was constructed for BV and NBV 18650 cells, as shown in
Fig. 2b, and for two diﬀerent casing thicknesses (220 and 250 μm). The
ISC device enabled control of when and where thermal runaway would
initiate within the cell and was placed at the four diﬀerent locations
shown in Fig. 1a. Standard cells without ISC devices were also tested for
comparison. The results of this extensive study of 228 cells are sum-
marized in Fig. 2c–f. The number in the colored boxes in Fig. 2c–f is the
fraction of the total cells tested that underwent the speciﬁed failure
mechanisms. Color-coding in Fig. 2c–f is set to help qualitatively
convey unfavorable events. Cells tested in Fig. 2c–f were sometimes
oriented diﬀerently but were always in an environment that facilitated
ejection from both ends of the cell. Orientation is not thought to aﬀect
the failure mechanisms, as internal pressure-induced dynamics are ex-
pected to far outweigh any gravitational aﬀects from diﬀerent or-
ientations.
Risks for standard (non-ISC) cells: For standard non-ISC cells
(Figs. 2c), 100% of the bottom vents activated on the BV cells with
220 μm casings, of which 44% were accompanied by a bottom breach.
In comparison, the equivalent NBV cell showed a lower risk (16%) of a
bottom breach occurring, but an increased risk of top bursting (2%) and
top breaches (7%). This indicates that the BV helps mitigate the risk of
cells bursting or breaching at the header via improved pressure relief
and reduced strain on the header components during thermal runaway.
BV cells demonstrated an increased risk of bottom breaches when
compared to their NBV counterparts. The thick casing (250 μm) NBV
cells demonstrated a reduced risk of bottom breaches occurring (0%)
than the thinner 220 μm casing cells, but a similar risk of top breaches
occurring (7%). The thick casing cells were shown to have a reduced
risk of breaches occurring overall, which is most likely due to increased
mechanical strength and improved heat dissipation on the casing.
Inﬂuence of longitudinal location of initiation on risks: For the
220 μm BV cells, the position of the ISC device was 6 layers deep and
varied longitudinally (top, middle, and bottom). The longitudinal lo-
cation of the ISC device, and hence the location of initiation of thermal
runaway, was shown to drastically aﬀect the failure mechanism of the
cell (Fig. 2d). Cells with an ISC device placed near the top had a much
higher risk of top bursting (9%) and top breaches (64%) than cells
where the ISC device was placed near the bottom, where 0% of cells
underwent top bursting and top breaching. Conversely, when the ISC
device was placed near the bottom, 100% of cells underwent bottom
bursting and breaching, whereas 0% of cells underwent top bursting
and breaching. Placing the ISC device near the bottom also showed the
highest risk of side-wall breach (17%). Placing the ISC device in the
middle consistently demonstrated intermediate behavior, where 8% of
cells underwent top bursting and breaches, and 54% and 62% of cells
underwent bottom bursting and bottom breaching, respectively. In
summary, the proximity of the ISC device to either end of the
18650 cells signiﬁcantly increased the risk of bursting and/or breaching
occurring at that end. For all cases, breaching at the top, middle, and
bottom, occurred on the side where the ISC device was placed illus-
trating that the ISC device provides longitudinal as well as circumfer-
ential control of where a breach is likely to occur.
Inﬂuence of radial location of initiation on risks: The inﬂuence of
the radial position of the ISC device on the failure mechanism was in-
vestigated by placing the ISC device 6 or 3 layers deep near the middle
of 220 μm BV and NBV cells, as well as 250 μm NBV cells (Fig. 2f).
Comparing the 220 μm BV cell with the ISC device 6 or 3 layers deep, a
slight increase in the risk of a top breach occurring (from 8% for 6
layers to 18% for 3 layers) and a slight decrease in the risk of bottom
breach (from 62% for 6 layers to 45% for 3 layers) are observed. Like
the non-ISC cells, the 220 μm and 250 μm NBV cells showed a reduced
risk of bottom bursting (0%) and bottom breach (9% and 0%, respec-
tively), for cells with the ISC 3 layers deep.
Inﬂuence of thicker casings and bottom vents on risks: NBV cells
with a thicker casing (250 μm) were shown to be more resilient against
top bursting than their 220 μm counterparts, where 0% of the 250 μm
cells tested burst (Fig. 2e). A strong dependence was observed between
the location of the ISC device and the 250 μm cell's propensity to un-
dergo breaches. The percentage of NBV cells that underwent top
breaches for the ISC device placed at the top, middle and bottom, were
56%, 42%, and 38% respectively, decreasing in risk as the distance of
the ISC device from the top increased. NBV cells with the ISC device
located at the middle showed the highest risk of side and bottom
breaches, with 14% and 43% respectively. Comparing the results in
Fig. 2c–e, it is observed that inclusion of the bottom vent leads to a
reduced risk of top bursting and breaching overall but increases the risk
of bottom bursting and breaching. The increase in casing thickness from
220 μm to 250 μm is shown to have reduced the risk of bursting at the
top and bottom, and, as observed in Fig. 2c, reduces the risk of
breaching. Almost all the NBV cells that did not undergo a bottom
breach showed discoloration due to oxidation of the steel casing at
elevated temperatures (Fig. 2b) on the base plate on the side clocked
with the circumferential position of the ISC device.
The location of the ISC device greatly inﬂuenced the propensity of
cells to incur high risk failure mechanisms, such as bursting or brea-
ches, at certain locations along the surface of the casing. To explain the
external risks with respect to internal phenomena, the external tem-
perature proﬁles and internal structural dynamics that lead to
breaching are examined in the following section.
Supplementary video related to this article can be found at https://
doi.org/10.1016/j.jpowsour.2019.01.077.
3.2. Identifying the cause of breaches
The position of the ISC device and hence the location of thermal
runaway initiation clearly inﬂuences the risk and nature of the breaches
along the casing of the cell (Fig. 2). The underlying thermal and
structural dynamics that contribute to the relationship between location
of failure initiation and risk of breaches is explored via a combined
approach of high-rate thermal imaging (50 fps) and high-speed X-ray
imaging (> 2000 fps). In this section, the risk map shown in Fig. 2 is
explained with respect to surface temperatures and dynamic internal
phenomena.
External phenomena: Two typical examples of a top breach and
bottom breach that occur for the ISC device positioned at the top and
bottom, respectively, are shown in Fig. 2. As observed in the thermal
images in Fig. 2g and h, within the ﬁrst 0.08 s of initiation, the venting
ﬂare is shown to deﬂect at an angle of about 60° from vertical, which is
highlighted by the red arrows. In the case of the top vent breach
(Fig. 2a), the ﬂare appears to deﬂect oﬀ the spin-groove and top button.
In the case of the BV breach (Fig. 2b) the ﬂare appears to deﬂect oﬀ the
outer rim of the base plate following activation of the BV. After ca.
0.08 s, the ﬂare melts through the material oﬀ which it was deﬂected,
and changes to a vertical direction. In every instance, the breach oc-
curred on the side of the ISC device directly above or below its position.
The breach is shown in the post-mortem photographs in Fig. 2g and h,
and as seen in the inset photograph of the opposite side, there is also
observable damage on the side aligned with the location of the ISC
device.
Internal phenomena: High-speed X-ray imaging during thermal
runaway of the cells enabled the linking of external observations with
internal events, with high temporal resolution. Fig. 3a and b, show the
events leading up to the breach of the cells presented in Fig. 2g and h,
respectively. The formation of a breach in the casing of the cell is seen
as a dark shadow expanding, which indicates that the steel casing in
that region was melting away and a gap was opening. The formation of
the breach is most clearly seen in the Supplementary Movies 3 and 4,
where its progression is relatively eye-catching compared to the static
images presented in Fig. 3. To help with identifying the progression of
the breaches in Fig. 3, the features are highlighted using red circles and
arrows. In Fig. 3a, the ISC device was placed 6 layers deep near the top
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of the cell, and the cell was oriented such that the ISC device was
parallel with the ﬁeld-of-view on the right side of the image. Upon
initiation of thermal runaway, the active material broke down and
ejected with ﬂuid-like properties. The observable ﬂow of the ﬂuidized
reacting material in Supplementary Movies 3 and 4 is represented as
yellow streamlines in Fig. 3. In Fig. 3a, the ﬂow of ejecting material is
ﬁrst seen to deﬂect oﬀ the spin-groove and pass out through the vent.
This region of deﬂection experienced increased thermal stress due to
enhanced convective heat transfer and was thus a region that was re-
latively more susceptible to weakening, melting, and undergoing a
breach. The spin-groove initially melted, soon followed by the top-fold
holding the header components, allowing the molten material to ﬂow
unimpeded vertically out of the cell. This change in ﬂow direction is
seen externally between 0.00 s and 0.08 s in Fig. 2g.
Supplementary video related to this article can be found at https://
doi.org/10.1016/j.jpowsour.2019.01.077.
Similarly, after the BV activated, the ejecting ﬂuidized materials
initially deﬂected oﬀ the outer rim and passed out through the vent
(Fig. 3b). The region at which the material deﬂected melted within ca.
0.1 s and the melted hole continued to widen over ca. 0.15 s. The di-
rection of ﬂow, as illustrated by the yellow streamlines in Fig. 3b,
changed from curving around the outer rim to passing directly through
the outer rim, a change that is observed in the thermal images between
0.02 s and 0.06 s in Fig. 2h. As seen in Fig. 2, cells without a BV were
much less likely to undergo a bottom breach than BV cells. In Fig. 3c
(Supplementary Movie 5), the internal structural dynamics of an NBV
cell without an ISC device are shown. The yellow streamlines show that
the broken-down ﬂuidized material initially ﬂowed towards the base
plate of the cell, but took a 180° turn towards the top vent due to the
pressure drop through the vacant core of the electrode assembly. The
base plate still acted as a point of deﬂection (hence the frequent dis-
coloration shown in Fig. 2b) but was not as susceptible to breaches
forming. This may be due to the complete base plate acting as a better
heat sink than the base plate with a BV missing, and helping to dissipate
heat and mitigate the formation of hot spots. Note that for BV cells, the
bottom breach occurred in addition to the bottom vent rupture, that is
to say, there were two separate holes in the base of the cell, one from
the bottom vent, and one breach hole on the remaining annulus.
Supplementary video related to this article can be found at https://
doi.org/10.1016/j.jpowsour.2019.01.077.
3.3. Thermal behavior of cells and vulnerabilities
In determining the ‘worst-case’ location of failure initiation, the
thermal behavior of the cell is a crucial aspect to consider. The surface
temperature of the cell is what determines the necessary properties of
the cell casing to avoid ruptures; i.e. high temperatures lead to lower
tensile strengths and increased susceptibility to breaching or bursting.
Fig. 3. Time-stamped radiographs showing (a) the top of a cell with ISC device located 6 layers deep at the top, where the region highlighted by the red circle shows a
hole forming on the spin-groove through which the ejecting material ﬂowed, as highlighted by the yellow streamlines; (b) a breach forming on the outer rim of the
base of a BV cell with ISC device placed near the bottom, where the red arrows highlight the opening breach and yellow streamlines highlight the change in direction
of ejecting material; (c) the base of an NBV cell without an ISC device, showing how the ejecting material ﬁrst deﬂects oﬀ the base plate before ejecting through the
core of the electrode assembly. Movies of (a), (b), and (c) are provided as Supplementary Movies 3, 4, and 5. (For interpretation of the references to color in this
ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the Web version of this article.)
D.P. Finegan et al. Journal of Power Sources 417 (2019) 29–41
35
The maximum surface temperature reached will also decide the thermal
requirements of the heatsink or insulator material placed between cells
in a module. The total heat output from a cell during thermal runaway,
as well as the fraction of heat stemming from the casing of the cell and
its ejected contents, is also critical to know when engineering a safe
module design. In this section, temperature gradients across the surface
of failing cells with a known location of thermal runaway initiation are
characterized, as well as the inﬂuence of location of failure initiation on
the overall heat output and the distribution of heat output from the
casing of the cell and its ejected contents.
Surface temperature: In Fig. 4, the temperature on the surface re-
gion closest to the ISC device is compared to the temperature on the
opposite side of the cell shortly after initiation of thermal runaway for
cells with an ISC device 6 layers deep, at the top, middle and bottom
(Fig. 4a–c). The maximum temperature reached at the surface of each
cell is between 600 °C and 650 °C, which occurred at the surface directly
in line with the position of the ISC device. The location of the point of
initiation was consistently identiﬁed as subsurface to the region that
reaches the highest temperature. Hence, the ISC device can be used to
determine the surface location that experiences the greatest thermal
abuse. During thermal runaway, there was a large temperature gradient
across the surface of each cell. For example, in Fig. 4a–c the tempera-
ture was measured on the side of the cell corresponding to the location
of the ISC device and was compared to the opposite side circumferen-
tially. The temperature diﬀerence between both sides was plotted and
showed that, following thermal runaway, there existed a circumfer-
ential temperature diﬀerence of> 200 °C. As seen in a previous study
[12], the hotspot formed at the ISC device extends internally towards
the vent as the ﬂuidized material ﬂows from the point of initiation in
the direction of the pressure drop. Here, that ﬂow of material towards
the vent caused a hot spot to form on features of the casing that ob-
structed it (i.e. deﬂected the escaping ﬂow), as seen in the thermal
images in Fig. 4a and c. It's clear that the location of initiation inﬂu-
ences the surface temperature of the cell, it's susceptibility to incur a
breach at certain locations, and hence the risks posed by the cell inside
a battery system. It is also important to determine whether the location
of the ISC device (which mimics the eﬀect of a defect causing a short)
inﬂuences the total quantity of heat output, as well as the distribution
of heat output from the casing of the cell and its ejected contents. This
will be discussed in the following section.
Supplementary video related to this article can be found at https://
doi.org/10.1016/j.jpowsour.2019.01.077.
Total and fractional heat output: The fractional thermal runaway
calorimeter (FTRC) described in a previous study [6] was used to
measure the total heat output from a single cell and discern the fraction
of heat that stemmed from the cell casing (red in Fig. 5a), the material
ejected from the positive end of the cell (blue in Fig. 5a), and material
ejected from the negative end of the cell (black in Fig. 5a). This setup
enabled direct comparison between the total and fractional heat output
from cells for various positions of the ISC device and cell designs. In
Fig. 5b–e, the inﬂuence of radial and longitudinal positioning of the ISC
device for BV and NBV cells on the total and distribution of heat output
between ejected and non-ejected materials is presented. The complete
data-set from these experiments, including standard deviations and
post-test cell masses, is provided in Table 1.
Inﬂuence of longitudinal position of initiation on heat output: The
ISC device was placed 6 layers radially into the electrode assembly near
the top, middle and bottom of the cell. Fig. 5b and c shows the total and
fractional heat outputs for each case in BV and NBV cells, respectively.
The associated standard deviations are presented in Table 1. The
longitudinal location of the ISC device did not appear to signiﬁcantly
aﬀect the total quantity of heat emitted or the fraction of heat emitted
from the casing of the cells, but, as expected, had a large eﬀect on the
fraction of heat ejected from the top and bottom of the cells. For BV
cells, when the ISC device was placed near the top an average of 51.1%
of the total heat was emitted from contents ejected through the top,
whereas when the ISC device was placed near the bottom, only 32.5%
of heat was ejected through the top. Similarly, the fraction of heat that
was emitted from material ejected from the bottom of BV cells in-
creased from an average of 11.7%–31.4% between changing the loca-
tion of the ISC device from the top to the bottom. This behavior is also
ampliﬁed by a higher quantity of cells undergoing breaching near the
location of the ISC device as shown in Fig. 2d (e.g. when the device is
placed near the top, there is a higher risk of a top breach occurring). A
similar relationship between proximity of the ISC device to one end,
and the mass of materials ejected at that end, was observed; the average
masses ejected through the top of the cell when the ISC device was
positioned at the bottom, middle and top, were 5.3 g, 8.5 g, and 10.2 g,
respectively. The average masses ejected through the BV for the ISC
device positioned at the bottom, middle, and top, are 4.8 g, 3.0 g, and
2.5 g, respectively. This correlation between the quantity of mass and
heat ejected is expected, since the active material was exposed to an
oxygen rich environment and would have continued to generate heat
for a short period of time outside the cell. For NBV cells, the proximity
of the ISC device to the bottom of the cell appeared to increase the
fraction of heat ejected from the bottom. This was due to the increased
risk of cells undergoing a bottom breach (0% for the ISC at the top,
compared to 25% for the ISC at the bottom), as shown in Fig. 2e. This
demonstrates that for both BV and NBV cells, the proximity of the ISC
device to either end of the cell increases the fraction of the total heat
that is ejected at that end.
Fig. 4. (Left) Thermal images with marked measurement regions [1,2] and
(right) plot of temperature diﬀerence between regions [1,2], with raw tem-
perature measurements inset for a BV cell with the ISC device 6 layers deep at
(a) the top with the cell oriented upright, (b) the middle with the cell oriented
upright, and (c) the bottom with the cell oriented upside down showing the BV.
The gray lines in the plots designate the time to which the thermal images
correspond. Movies of (a), (b) and (c) are provided as Supplementary Movies 2,
6, and 7.
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Inﬂuence of radial position of initiation on heat output: In Fig. 5c
and e, the total and fractional heat output for ISC devices placed 6 and 3
layers deep for BV and NBV cells, respectively. An increase in the total
heat output is observed for the ISC device positioned 3 layers deep
compared to 6 layers deep. The average heat output for 3 layers deep in
a BV cell is 6.9% more than 6 layers deep, and for NBV cells the average
heat output is 13.9% greater than for 6 layers deep. This behavior may
be related to the diﬀerence in the ﬂow path of ejecting material (being
more direct when the ISC occurs 6 layers deep) and the local dissipation
of heat (with more thermal mass surrounding the ISC device 6 layers
deep). The radial location of the ISC device also appears to aﬀect the
fractional heat output for BV cells, where more heat is ejected through
the base of the cell for 6 layers deep than 3 layers deep (18.6% com-
pared to 11.1%). This may be caused by there being a more direct path
for ﬂuidized material to escape when the short occurs deeper into the
electrode assembly. Conversely, less heat is ejected through the top of
the cell for 6 layers deep than 3 layers deep, while the heat emitted
from the cell casing is similar for both cases (ca. 36%).
Inﬂuence of bottom vent on heat output: The most signiﬁcant im-
pact of the bottom vent is on the fractions of heat output from the
casing and its ejected contents, as well as the quantity of mass ejected
(Table 1). The presence of a bottom vent leads to a reduction in the
mass of material ejected and an increased fraction of heat emitted from
within the casing of the cell. On average, a post-thermal runaway BV
cell weighed ca. 24% (5 g) more than an NBV cell (Table 1). Further, of
the total quantity of heat generated, BV cells produced ca. 9% more
heat in the casing of the cell and ejected less heat overall. The enhanced
pressure relief in BV cells is expected to have reduced the pressure drop
between the inside of the cell and atmosphere during TR, and hence
reduced the driving force for materials to eject. That is to say, a re-
duction in the ejection of thermal mass and exothermically decom-
posing material caused more heat to be generated within the casing and
less heat to be dissipated elsewhere. This result demonstrates the safety
beneﬁts of improving pressure relief in 18650 cells. The concentrated
heat generation within the casing of 18650 BV cells may also have
safety advantages for some module designs that are particularly vul-
nerable to ejected heat sources, albeit additional considerations for the
bottom vent feature are needed, such as a head spacing on the bottom
as well as the top of the module.
3.4. Modelling thermal runaway to identify vulnerabilities
3D thermal runaway models were constructed to further elucidate
the causes of high-risk breach scenarios arising from local thermal
runaway (Fig. 2). The model parameters are based on the thermal
measurements outlined above. The radial, longitudinal, and cir-
cumferential rates of propagation of thermal runaway from the point of
initiation are approximated from the numerous high-speed X-ray ima-
ging movies of the ISC device activating and were used in the model.
The progression of the modelled reaction zone for when the ISC device
is placed near the top, middle, and bottom is shown in Fig. S3 of
Supplementary Material. The reaction zone propagated fastest in the
longitudinal and azimuthal directions [10,28], forming a hollow cy-
lindrically-shaped reaction zone seen between 0.4 s and 0.6 s (Fig. S3 in
Supplementary Material). The reaction reached completion in a shorter
time when the ISC was located at the middle, as seen by the reaction
zone encompassing the entire cell 1 s after initiation of thermal run-
away (Fig. S4a in Supplementary Material), whereas only ca. 90% of the
cell volume was encompassed when the ISC device is placed at the ends
of the cell (Figs. S4a and c in Supplementary Material). This stems from
the reaction front being able to propagate equally in both directions
when initiation occurs at the middle, whereas when initiation occurs
near either end, the reaction front halts at the end of the electrode
assembly while continuing uninterrupted in the opposite direction.
Fig. 5. (a) Color coded illustration of the FTRC for reference. (b) Statistical plot showing the heat output and averaged distribution of heat output for BV cells with
the ISC device placed 6 layers deep at the top, middle and bottom, and (c) 3 layers deep and 6 layers deep at the middle; and (d) for NBV cells with the ISC device
place 3 layers deep and 6 layers deep at the middle, and (e) 6 layers deep at the top, middle and bottom. (For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure
legend, the reader is referred to the Web version of this article.)
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Therefore, the rate of heat generation for the middle position is ex-
pected to surpass the top and bottom positions when the reaction front
is halted at one end, but the total quantity of heat produced upon
completion is expected to be similar, as observed experimentally in
Fig. 5.
Inﬂuence of longitudinal position of initiation on internal and
surface temperatures: The eﬀects of the reaction zone propagating from
the three diﬀerent positions on the internal and surface temperatures
are shown in Fig. 6 and the averaged internal and surface temperatures
are plotted in Fig. 7. The location of initiation had a signiﬁcant inﬂu-
ence on the temporal internal and surface temperatures where initiation
at the ends of the cell lead to higher temperatures at an early stage in
the thermal runaway process, compared to when thermal runaway is
initiated at the middle. Comparing scenarios where the initiation oc-
curred at the top and at the middle of the cell in Fig. 6a and b, it is
observed that after 0.6 s following initiation at the top, the maximum
surface temperature of the cell was> 300 °C greater than the cell where
initiation occurred at the middle. Within the ﬁrst 1 s following initiation
of thermal runaway, the highest surface temperatures were consistently
achieved for when initiation occurred near the bottom of the cell
(Fig. 6c). Further, the location of initiation also determined the tem-
perature diﬀerence across the surface of the cells, where the middle
position resulted in a more homogeneous surface temperature proﬁle
than the end positions. For example, between 0.8 s and 1 s in Fig. 6a
(top), the top of the cell reached 650 °C, while the bottom of the cell
remained at room temperature, but in Fig. 6b (middle) the maximum
temperature was ca. 400 °C while the rest of the cell was> 200 °C.
The maximum and average surface temperature for each location of
initiation in Fig. 6 is plotted in Fig. 7. Surface temperatures were con-
sistently lower when initiation occurred at the middle. This stems from
the diﬀerent geometry of thermal and reactive mass that the propaga-
tion front observes. In the case of initiation occurring near the middle of
the cell, the propagation continued in both longitudinal directions,
equally, until all reactive material broke down. Further, heat generated
from the middle position dissipated in both longitudinal directions,
thereby helping reduce local temperatures and homogenize the tem-
perature proﬁle across the surface. This reduced the rate of propagation
of thermal runaway at the early stages, as seen by the relatively small
reaction zone at 0.4 s in Fig. S4b in Supplementary Material. When
initiation occurred near either end of the cell, the thermal and reactive
mass in one direction was reduced. The heat that was generated from a
short at either end is mostly dissipated via conduction in one direction
only (away from that end). The reduced heat dissipation in this case
resulted in a more rapid temperature rise at the point of initiation and
accelerated the propagation of thermal runaway. Therefore, to test
temperature-related vulnerabilities at the top or bottom of cells or the
corresponding regions in battery modules, it is advised to initiate
thermal runaway at the appropriate end of the cell.
Inﬂuence of longitudinal position of initiation on bursting pres-
sure: An example of a temperature-dependent vulnerability is the
bursting pressure of the cell, which is a function of the temperature-
dependent tensile strength of the cell's steel casing. The tensile strength
of a common structural steel (S350GD) as a function of temperature was
applied to the surface temperature proﬁles in Fig. 6 and is presented in
Fig. 8. For a 3.35 Ah 18650 cell, it is expected that ca. 6 L of gas were
generated during thermal runaway [5]. If 6 L of gas is contained within
the 18650 casing volume (0.01674 L), and assuming the vents were
prevented from relieving pressure, the internal pressure would exceed
30MPa which is enough to cause the cell to burst even when the casing
is at room temperature, where the bursting pressure is ca. 9MPa (Fig. 8)
for the 220 μm thick casing. As the tensile strength of steels rapidly
decreases at temperatures> 100 °C, the bursting pressure will also
decrease. Hence, hotspots that form on the casing are most susceptible
to bursting. At temperatures between 400 °C and 800 °C, the bursting
pressure becomes particularly sensitive to temperature (see tensile
strength data in Supplementary Material), where even small diﬀerences
in surface temperature can lead to large diﬀerences in the bursting
pressure in this range. As seen in Fig. 8, initiation of thermal runaway
near the ends of the cells resulted in the lowest bursting pressure which
corresponded to the higher maximum temperatures achieved in Fig. 6.
The bursting pressure of the cell dropped below 1.5MPa after 0.6 s
following initiation of thermal runaway near the top and bottom of the
cells, whereas the lowest bursting pressure of ca. 2.5MPa occurred after
1 s for when thermal runaway initiated near the middle. The additional
heat dissipation for the middle initiation scenario kept the surface
temperature relatively low and helped maintain a higher casing tensile
strength overall. The higher casing tensile strength for the middle in-
itiation could withstand a higher internal pressure and hence a lower
ﬂowrate of escaping gases. This reduced the risk of the cell bursting in
the event that the ﬂowrate of escaping gases was hindered, as seen in a
previous study [9]. Hence, if a cell or module vulnerability against a
breach at a certain location needed to be tested, positioning the ISC
device at a longitudinal and radial position that corresponded to the
region of interest is advised. Thinner casings are advantageous for
purposely inducing breaches at certain locations (for testing vulner-
abilities of modules), but for improved safety, thicker casing designs for
improved heat dissipation and increased bursting pressures are re-
commended.
3.5. A discussion on cell safety and testing
Aside from changes in the chemistry of electrodes and electrolytes,
which are beyond the scope of this study, the mechanical design of cells
plays an important role in the safety of cells and modules. When
thermal runaway occurs, the mechanical design of the casing, vents,
and other safety features are what control the distribution of hot gases
Table 1
Data on the total heat output, the fractional heat distribution, cell masses pre
and post-thermal runaway (TR), and the distribution of post-thermal runaway
masses between ejected and non-ejected contents, for the four positions of the
ISC device implanted into bottom vent (BV) and non-bottom vent (NBV)
18650 cells. Standard deviation for each averaged value are also provided.
Color coding (red, blue, black), reﬂects the respective locations of measure-
ments within the calorimeter from Fig. 5a.
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and materials, as well as the dissipation of heat into the environment.
Most commercial 18650 cells are designed to eject heat and debris in
one direction only, through the top vent of the cell, and battery modules
are designed to accommodate this. Although rare, certain adverse and
unpredictable phenomena can lead to a divergence of this behavior. For
example, it was shown in a previous study [9] that if the electrode
assembly shifts and clogs the vent during thermal runaway the
18650 cell can violently burst or undergo a pressure-induced breach. It
is the bursting and side-wall breaches of cells that most often defeat
safety features in battery modules and lead to cell-to-cell propagation of
thermal runaway. The ISC device can be used to reliably replicate the
most unfavorable and otherwise unpredictable adverse failure me-
chanisms, such as bursting and side-wall breaches. This is a very
powerful tool for identifying vulnerabilities on the cell level (e.g.
identifying regions most likely to incur a breach), as well as on the
module level (e.g. intentionally causing breaches at a certain location to
test the eﬃcacy of a module design in preventing cell-to-cell propaga-
tion). For example, here we identiﬁed deﬂection points such as the spin-
groove and base plate as regions most susceptible to breaching. If a
battery pack is being designed for a mission critical application (e.g. the
life support system of a space suit) a matrix of high-energy density cells
with selectively located ISC devices could be used to improve con-
ﬁdence that the current module design can withstand worst-case in-
ternal shorting scenarios.
4. Conclusion
By linking internal dynamics to external risks, a comprehensive
description of high-risk failure scenarios of 18650 cells, their causes,
and their consequences, was developed. An internal short circuiting
(ISC) device was placed at diﬀerent longitudinal and radial positions
Fig. 6. Evolution of the internal and surface temperatures over 1 s following initiation of thermal runaway when the ISC was located (a) near the top, (b) at the
middle, and (c) near the bottom of an 18650 geometry.
Fig. 7. Modelled thermal runaway plots showing (a) the max surface tem-
perature and (b) the average surface temperature for when the ISC device is
placed at the top, middle and bottom of the 18650 cell.
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within the cells to test the eﬀect of location of thermal runaway in-
itiation on the failure mechanism of the three cell designs where high-
risk failure mechanisms such as bursting and breaching were of primary
interest. It was shown that by using an ISC device, the most likely
failure scenarios for inducing bursting and breaching of the cell casing
can be intentionally induced. For example, it was demonstrated that by
initiating thermal runaway near the top or bottom of an 18650 cell, the
risk of breaching at the respective end is signiﬁcantly increased. Using
this method, a risk-map outlining the conditions necessary for certain
high-risk failure mechanisms was generated.
The external risks posed by initiating failure at diﬀerent locations
were explained with respect to surface temperature proﬁles, total heat
output, as well as the fractional heat generated from the ejected and
non-ejected contents. The location of thermal runaway initiation in-
ﬂuenced the quantity of heat and mass ejected from the cell, where the
highest surface temperatures and the greatest quantity of heat was
ejected at the end of the cell where the ISC device was placed. This
approach allowed comparisons between diﬀerent cell designs to be
drawn; the introduction of a bottom vent on the 18650 cell was found to
signiﬁcantly reduce the quantity of ejected mass and heat during
thermal runaway by more eﬀectively relieving pressure and reducing
the pressure drop from inside to outside the cell.
The cause of the adverse failure mechanisms and their link to the
location of thermal runaway initiation were explained by using high-
speed synchrotron X-ray imaging and computational modelling. The
interaction between the mechanical design of the cells and the internal
structural dynamics played a pivotal role in determining the external
risks. High-speed X-ray imaging revealed that the active materials
within the cell underwent a phase change from solid to liquid during
thermal runaway and ejected with ﬂuid-like properties. Regions that
deﬂected the escaping ﬂow of hot material, such as the spin-groove and
the base plate, were found to be at the highest risk of breaching. A
thermal runaway model was developed using parameters extracted
from the X-ray images as well as thermal measurements from infrared
imaging and calorimetry, to further elucidate why certain regions were
more prone to breaching than others. The thermal runaway model re-
vealed that, due to diﬀerences in the heat dissipation properties at
diﬀerent locations along the electrode assembly, the surface tempera-
ture proﬁles signiﬁcantly varied with location of thermal runaway in-
itiation. This was due to reduced heat dissipation from the reaction
zone when thermal runaway initiated near either end of the cell.
Consequently, the bursting pressure of the casing at the exception
hotspots generated when initiation of thermal runaway occurred near
the top or bottom of the cell, was signiﬁcantly lower than the bursting
pressure achieved when initiation took place near the middle of the cell.
These results helped identify the vulnerable regions of the cell
(around the spin-groove and base plate) and highlight that additional
support is needed, such as using more thermally stable alloys or thicker
steel to enhance heat dissipation and improve the tensile strength
during thermal runaway. This work also demonstrates the application
of ISC devices for intentionally inducing worst-case thermal runaway
scenarios to test the eﬃcacy of next generation cell or module designs
in avoiding catastrophic failure. And ﬁnally, the combination of tech-
niques presented here (high-speed X-ray imaging, fractional thermal
runaway calorimetry, and thermal imaging) was established as a
powerful diagnostic approach for developing comprehensive descrip-
tions of battery failure and associated risks. The detailed information of
thermal and structural dynamics is not only useful for informing en-
gineering design, but can also be used to enhance safety-focused multi-
physics models of Li-ion batteries.
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Fig. 8. Surface proﬁles of bursting pressures over 1 s following initiation of
thermal runaway when the ISC was located (a) near the top, (b) at the middle,
and (c) near the bottom of an 18650 geometry, based on the reduction in tensile
strength of steel at increased localized temperature.
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Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://
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